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NOTES
Toward a Group Rights Theory for
Remedying Harm to the Subsistence
Culture of Alaska Natives
This Note argues that Alaska Natives' subsistence lifestyle is an
essential element of their culture and should be protected as such
by the law. After outlining alternate understandings of subsis-
tence, the Note analyzes the current treatment of subsistence as
culture in both federal and Alaska law. The Note contends that
existing law does not adequately value Native subsistence culture
because it denies the existence of a right in some cases and
provides ineffective remedies in others. The Note concludes by
proposing a system in which Native villages would be vested with
a group right to recover for damage to subsistence culture.
I. INTRODUCTION
[T]he entry of oil companies into Alaska in the late 1950s and
thereafter was not the first (and likely not the last) challenge to
Native culture. Who moved in on whom as between the Alutik,
Indian, and Yupik/Inupiat peoples is lost in the anthropological
fog of ten to fifty thousand years ago. Then came the Russians,
then the American whalers, then the miners, and with them the
United States Government came to Alaska.
All of these incursions have impacted and, to a lesser or
greater degree affected, Native culture.
-United States District Judge H. Russell Holland'
While Alaska Natives have faced decades, even centuries, of
profound challenges to their unique way of life, perhaps no single
year was as trying for Alaska's indigenous population as 1989.
Copyright © 1995 by Alaska Law Review
1. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, Order No. 190, 1994 WL 182856,
at *4 (D. Alaska March 23, 1994).
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That year presented two formidable obstacles to Natives' ongoing
struggle to maintain their cultural identity. First, on March 24,
1989, the largest oil spill in U.S. history occurred when the Exxon
Valdez oil tanker ran aground at Bligh Reef, releasing more than
eleven million gallons of oil into the surrounding waters of Prince
William Sound.2 Second, on December 22, 1989, the Alaska
Supreme Court ruled in McDowell v. State that a key provision of
the state's statute governing subsistence uses of fish and game
violated various sections of the state constitution.3
While these two events might at first appear unrelated, they
illustrate the two contemporary factors that circumscribe Alaska
Natives' ability to perpetuate their culture. The Exxon Valdez oil
spill demonstrates that environmental disasters can substantially
and rapidly deplete the natural resource base upon which Alaska
Natives depend to maintain their way of life.4 At the same time,
the McDowell decision, which increased the ability of non-Natives
to access the scarce resources traditionally used for Native subsis-
tence,5 increased the likelihood of further depletion of such
resources.6 In sum, these developments are typical of the daunting
2. For a summary of the chronology of the Exxon Valdez spill, see John
Gallagher, Note, In the Wake of the Exxon Valdez: Murky Legal Waters of
Liability and Compensation, 25 NEw ENG. L. REV. 571, 571 n.1 (1990).
3. 785 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989) (holding that the "rural residency" requirement
for protection of subsistence uses contained in Alaska Statutes section 16.05.-
940(32) violated sections 3, 15, and 17 of Article VIII of the Alaska Constitution).
4. Christopher L. Dyer et al., Social Disruption and the Valdez Oil Spill:
Alaskan Natives in a Natural Resource Community, 12 Soc. SPECTRUM 105, 117
(1992) (noting that for a vast majority of the communities in the Prince William
Sound area, the harvest level of subsistence resources in the year following the
spill was the lowest of any year for which data are available).
5. See State v. Morry, 836 P.2d 358, 368 (Alaska 1992) (declaring that "after
McDowell there are no statutory standards for determining those individuals who
are ineligible to participate in subsistence hunting and fishing").
6. See, e-g., DAVID S. CASE, ALAsKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS 275
(1984) ("Recent urbanization in Alaska and the transformation of hunting and
fishing into a sport for many Alaskans have added another element to this
competition [for natural resources.]"); James M. Boardman, Casenote, McDowell
v. State of Alaska: Is a Limited Entry Subsistence System on the Horizon?, 26
WILLAMETrE L. REV. 999, 999 (1990) ("Today, demand and competition for
valuable, limited fish and wildlife resources grow. Conflicts among three different
user groups-subsistence, commercial, and sport-continue to escalate.").
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challenge that Alaska Natives will continue to face in attempting to
protect their traditional way of life.
This Note will analyze how both federal and Alaska law have
responded to these contemporary challenges and will suggest ways
in which subsistence law might better address threats to Alaska
Natives' subsistence lifestyle. Part II of this Note will describe the
subsistence way of life and will argue that subsistence rights are
understood better as Native group rights rather than as individual
rights. Part III will then demonstrate that the current tendency to
analyze subsistence as an individual right leads to inadequate legal
protection for Alaska Native culture. Finally, Part IV will propose
a legal regime based upon a group rights view of subsistence,
defend a notion of group rights as appropriate in this area of the
law and argue that such a scheme will supply more fitting rights
and remedies to preserve this distinctive way of life.
II. DEFINING SUBSISTENCE: SUSTENANCE OR CULTURE?
Much of the subsistence debate in Alaska revolves around the
definition of the term "subsistence" itself. Each of the two primary
understandings of subsistence, one as an individual right to suste-
nance, the other as a group's right to subsistence to sustain its
culture and traditions, influences the perceived scope and nature of
subsistence rights.
A. Subsistence as an Individual Right to Sustenance
Soon [the Native Americans'] means of subsistence has almost
entirely gone, and these unlucky folk prowl their deserted forests
like starving wolves .... So, strictly speaking, it is not the
Europeans who chase the natives of America away, but famine
-Alexis De Tocqueville
De Tocqueville's nineteenth century description of Native
subsistence and the harm resulting from its disruption is an accurate
one. Subsistence involves the hunting, fishing and gathering of
7. See James A. Fall, The Division of Subsistence of the Alaska Department
of Fish and Game: An Overview of its Research Program and Findings: 1980-1990,
27 ARCriC ANTHROPOLOGY 68,88 (1990) ("The job of describing and understand-
ing contemporary subsistence hunting, fishing, and gathering in Alaska is a tremen-
dous undertaking which has only begun.").
8. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 323 (J.P. Mayer
ed. & George Lawrence trans., 1988).
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natural resources as the principal means of obtaining food.9 The
view of subsistence as a method of achieving sustenance has
remained a popular one, both in Alaska"0 and elsewhere. Thus,
"subsistence as sustenance," what some commentators have called
the "minimalist perception of subsistence,"' 2 plays a crucial role
in the lives of many Alaskans.
Subsistence as sustenance has persisted among Alaska Natives
for various reasons. The region's harsh climate, its distance from
other food sources, high regional unemployment among Alaska
Natives and Natives' relative lack of cash reserves combine to make
reliance on natural resources a virtual necessity. 3 Nutritional
concerns may also compel Natives to use locally harvested
resources as a food staple.'4 In addition, some Native Alaskans
9. See, e.g., CASE, supra note 6, at 275 ("[S]ubsistence uses must, at the very
least, include ... hunting, fishing or gathering for the primary purpose of acquiring
food."); Mary Kancewick & Eric Smith, Subsistence in Alaska: Towards a Native
Priority, 59 UMKC L. REv. 645, 648 (1991) ("[S]ubsistence hunting and fishing.
•. refers to hunting and fishing to provide necessary food.").
10. E.g., Bobby v. Alaska, 718 F. Supp. 764, 777 (D. Alaska 1989) ("In its
purest form, the subsistence lifestyle is quite literally the gaining of one's
sustenance off the land."); State v. Tanana Valley Sportsmen's Ass'n, Inc., 583
P.2d 854, 859 n.18 (Alaska 1978) ("For hundreds of years, many of the Native
people of Alaska depended on hunting to obtain the necessities of life."); THOMAS
R. BERGER, VILLAGE JOuRNEY 5 (1985) ("In Alaska... subsistence means
hunting, fishing, and gathering."); Kancewick & Smith, supra note 9, at 648 ("This
... understanding [of subsistence, being dependent upon hunting and fishing for
food,] has been plentifully evident in the newspaper coverage of the subsistence
controversy in Alaska.").
11. E.g., Sekco Energy, Inc. v. MV Margaret Chouest 820 F. Supp. 1008, 1015
(E.D. La. 1993) (declaring that the term "subsistence use" "relates to use of a
natural resource ... to obtain the minimum necessities for life") (quoting In re
Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 669, 678 (E.D. Mich. 1992)).
12. Kancewick & Smith, supra note 9, at 648.
13. CASE, supra note 6, at 275.
14. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 343 (D.D.C.) ("[A]
scientific panel on the nutritional aspects of aboriginal whaling... has found that
when Eskimos have changed to a modem diet, their health and nutrition have
deteriorated."), affd in part and rev'd in part, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980); CASE,
supra note 6, at 275 ("[I]n Alaska ... those... relying on the subsistence way of
life do in fact depend on renewable resources for a substantial portion of their
nutrition."); Catherine A. Rinaldi, Note, Amoco Production v. Village of Gambefi"
The Limits to Federal Protection of Native Alaskan Subsistence, 7 VA. J. NAT.
REsOuRcES L. 147, 151-52 (1987) ("[S]tudies have shown that a subsistence diet
has special nutritional value and lends itself better to survival in Alaska than
would a more conventional diet.").
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have complained that non-Native foods fail to satisfy their
hunger.'" In short, disruptions in the ability to harvest subsistence
resources negatively affect the physical welfare of subsistence
users16 and, if left unremedied, might ultimately result in the
repercussions that De Tocqueville predicted.
Both federal and Alaska law have recognized that subsistence
as sustenance is important to Alaskans and, in response, have
granted legal rights to engage in subsistence practices. For
instance, in the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act
(ANILCA),' Congress explicitly declared that Alaskans rely on
subsistence resources for sustenance and that the availability of
such resources is presently threatened." In response, Congress
provided a resource management scheme for federal lands that
accords a preference to subsistence uses. 9 Alaska has enacted a
15. ANN FEENup-RIoRDAN, WHEN OUR BAD SEASON COMES: A CULTURAL
ACCOUNT OF SUBSISTENCE HARVESTING AND HARvEsT DISRUPTION ON THE
YUKON DELTA 322-23 (1986).
16. FIENup-RIORDAN, supra note 15, at 303 ("[N]utritional impoverishment
would result in the event of even a low-level disruption of a single [subsistence]
species."); Preston Michie, Note, Alaskan Natives: Eskimos and Bowhead Whales:
An Inquiry into Cultural and Environmental Values that Clash in Courts of Law,
7 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 79, 85 (1979).
17. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C.A. §§ 3111-3126 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995)).
18. In its findings, ANILCA provides in pertinent part that
[t]he Congress finds and declares that:
i2) the situation in Alaska is unique in that, in most cases, no
practical alternative means are available to replace the food supplies and
other items gathered from fish and wildlife which supply rural residents
dependent on subsistence uses [and that]
(3) continuation of the opportunity for subsistence uses of resources
on public and other lands in Alaska is threatened by the increasing
population of Alaska, with resultant pressure on subsistence resources,
by sudden decline in the populations of some wildlife species which are
crucial subsistence resources, by increased accessibility of remote areas
containing subsistence resources, and by taking of fish and wildlife in a
manner inconsistent with recognized principles of fish and wildlife
management.
16 U.S.C. § 3111.
19. Section 804 of ANILCA declares, in part, that "the taking on public lands
of fish and wildlife for nonwasteful subsistence uses shall be accorded priority over
the taking on such lands of fish and wildlife for other purposes." Id. § 3114.
ANILCA's resource management scheme and subsistence preference will be
discussed in greater detail infra, at notes 71-97 and accompanying text.
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somewhat similar system of preferences governing state lands,'
primarily due to shared concerns about subsistence as suste-
nance.
2 1
Any right to engage in subsistence solely for purposes of
sustenance is, at its root, an individual one. An "individual right"
establishes what one commentator has described as "limitations on
organized society and government in favor of the individual."'  In
essence, al individual right is possessed by an individual qua
individual and, as such, can only be asserted by its individual
possessor. Thus, rights to subsistence arise from "whatever
individual right or privilege the U.S. or state governments recognize
to food, shelter, and clothing, federal equal protection guarantees,
and [Alaska's] provision that its citizens have equal individual
rights to natural resources."'  While the collection and distribu-
tion of subsistence resources is almost always undertaken by some
sort of group,24 the actual consumption of those resources and the
physical benefit derived therefrom necessarily occur at an individu-
al level. Furthermore, the harm resulting from the deprivation of
a right to subsistence as sustenance is individual as well, as only
individuals can physically starve. In short, if subsistence practices
are defined in terms of sustenance, then rights associated with those
practices accrue to the individual alone, and remedies based on
notions of individual rights suitably would redress any potential
harm.
B. Subsistence as a Group Right to Culture
When we talk about subsistence .... we should be talking about
Native culture and their land .... You cannot break out subsis-
20. See ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.258 (1992). Alaska's subsistence preference
statute will be analyzed in greater depth infra, at notes 99-125 and accompanying
text.
21. See McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1, 10 (Alaska 1989) ("One purpose of the
[subsistence preference statute] is to ensure that those Alaskans who need to
engage in subsistence hunting and fishing in order to provide for their basic
necessities are able to do so.").
22. Robert N. Clinton, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples as Collective Group
Rights, 32 ARIz. L. REv. 739, 740 (1990) (emphasis added).
23. Kancewick & Smith, supra note 9, at 652. This source of subsistence rights,
at least as a matter of state law, appears to have been validated by State v. Eluska,
724 P.2d 514 (Alaska 1986).
24. Indeed, group action lies at the core of subsistence activities, particularly
among Alaska Natives. See infra notes 25-53 and accompanying text.
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tence or the meaning of subsistence or try to identify it, and you
can't break it out of the culture. The culture and the life of my
Native people are the subsistence way of life. And that's what
we always used, the subsistence way of life. It goes hand in
hand with our own culture, our own language, and all our
activities.
-Jonathon Solomon, Fort Yukon
Defining subsistence in Alaska solely in terms of sustenance is
not completely satisfactory. As a general matter, most observers
agree that subsistence involves something more than merely
hunting and fishing in order to procure food. 6 This "something
more" can be characterized as "subsistence as culture."
For Alaska Natives, subsistence includes not only hunting and
fishing for physical sustenance. It also encompasses a complex web
of relationships that define and distinguish their traditional culture.
As Thomas R. Berger, former chairman of the Alaska Native
Review Commission, explained, "[f]or Alaska Natives, subsistence
lies at the heart of culture, the truths that give meaning to human
life of every kind. Subsistence enables the Native peoples to feel
at one with their ancestors, at home in the present, confident of the
future."'7  Thus, for Alaska Natives, the term "subsistence"
connotes a unique way of existence that has been, and continues to
be, passed down from generation to generation for as long as they
can remember.2s
Despite the reluctance of some Alaska residents to recognize
this cultural component of subsistence,29 the notion of "subsistence
as culture" has been nearly unanimously accepted by a broad array
25. BERGER, supra note 10, at 52 (quoting Jonathon Solomon).
26. See, e.g., id. at 48-72; CASE, supra note 6, at 276; FIENUP-RORDAN, supra
note 15; Boardman, supra note 6, at 1000-01; Kathy A. Gudgell, Note, ANILCA
under Attack- Will the Right To Travel Wreak Havoc with Subsistence Rights?, 9
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 167 (1994); Kancewick & Smith, supra note 9,
at 649-52; Darrin J. Quam, Comment, Right to Subsist: The Alaska Natives'
Campaign to Recover Damages Caused by the Exxon Valdez Spill, 5 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 178-80 (1992); Rinaldi, supra note 14, at 149-53; Marlyn J.
Twitchell, Note, Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambel- Federal Subsistence
Protection Ends at Alaska's Border, 18 ENVTL. L. 635 (1988).
27. BERGER, supra note 10, at 55.
28. See generally Kancewick & Smith, supra note 9, at 645-52.
29. See id. at 648 (citing various stories in Alaska newspapers in which some
non-Native residents imply that the availability of commercial food sources
abrogates any need for Natives to engage in subsistence).
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of authorities. Congress," federal administrative officials,31
federal courts,32 Alaska courts,33 and commentators in the fields
of anthropology,34 sociology,35 psychology,36 and law37 have all
acknowledged, to one degree or another, the cultural significance
of Native subsistence.
Just as harm to subsistence as sustenance can lead to nutrition-
al impoverishment," the disruption of subsistence resources can
also cause cultural injury. Such damage can take many forms. For
30. See 16 U.S.C. § 3111(1) (1994) ("[T]he continuation of the opportunity for
subsistence uses ... is essential to Native... traditionall] and cultural existence
31. See North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 342 (D.D.C.)
(quoting an environmental impact statement prepared by the Department of
Interior for the proposition that subsistence is "the socio-cultural identification of
a traditional and unique lifestyle"), affd in part and rev'd in part, 642 F.2d 589
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 938 F.2d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 1991) ("If
[Alaska Natives'] right to fish is destroyed, so too is their traditional way of life.");
Katelnikoff v. United States Dep't of Interior, 657 F. Supp. 659, 665 (D. Alaska
1986) ("[W]hat was to be protected [by a subsistence exemption to the Marine
Mammal Protection Act] was the right [of Alaska Natives] to be left alone and to
continue their centuries-old way of life .... ").
33. See, e.g., State v. Tanana Valley Sportsmen's Ass'n, 583 P.2d 854, 859 n.18
(Alaska 1978) ("[S]ubsistence hunting is at the core of the cultural tradition of
many [Alaska Natives].").
34. See generally, FIENUF-RIORDAN, supra note 15.
35. See, e.g., Christopher L. Dyer, Tradition Loss as Secondary Disaster: Long-
Term Cultural Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 13 SOC. SPECTRUM 65, 75
(1993) ("[S]ubsistence... provide[s] the primary means of cultural existence.");
Dyer et al., supra note 4, at 110 ("A subsistence lifestyle practiced by ancestors
defines the contemporary cultural identity of [Alaska Native] communities.").
36. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Palinkas et al., Community Patterns of Psychiatric
Disorders after the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1517, 1522
(1993) [hereinafter Palinkas et al., Community Patterns] ("[S]ubsistence activities
. . . provide the foundation for social support and community cohesion.");
Lawrence A. Palinkas et al., Social Cultural, and Psychological Impacts of the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 52 HUM. ORGANIZATION 1, 3 (1993) [hereinafter Palinkas
et al., Social Cultura and Psychological Impacts] ("[T]he social processes of
taking, processing, and distributing [subsistence] foods has cultural significance
beyond the importance of the food consumed.").
37. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 10, at 48-72; CASE, supra note 6, at 276;
FmNUp-RIORDAN, supra note 15; Boardman, supra note 6, at 1000-01; Gudgell,
supra note 26, at 167; Kancewick & Smith, supra note 9, at 647-52; Quam, supra
note 26, at 178-80; Rinaldi, supra note 14, at 149-53; Twitchell, supra note 26, at
636.
38. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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instance, a substantial decrease in subsistence harvests may precipi-
tate a breakdown in the interdependence between generations that
exists among extended Native families.39 Furthermore, it could
impair the spiritual significance of exchanging goods with other
community members,' replace the traditional notion of steward-
ship over land with the concept of individual ownership,4' and
disrupt all aspects of Native social and spiritual interaction.42
More importantly, however, disruptions of subsistence resources
may foster an inability to transmit cultural values, as well as Alaska
Natives' traditional language, from one generation to another.4'
These "'core traditions' are the essence of transgenerational
community, and provide for stability of community through
time."'  Thus, what ultimately is at stake in protecting subsistence
resources is the future existence of a unique and long-standing
Native culture.
Studies analyzing the cultural impacts of the Exxon Valdez
spill demonstrate the harm that the depletion of subsistence
resources can cause to Alaska Natives. For example, two different
studies have concluded that Alaska Natives living in villages
affected by the spill were more susceptible to various psychological
disorders than were non-Natives residing in similar communities.4'
Other sociological studies have found that the spill resulted in the
permanent displacement of Native social and exchange networks.4
These studies confirm that subsistence is culture for Alaska Natives
by showing that the cultural impacts of subsistence disruptions are
not only substantial, but are also qualitatively different from the
harm suffered by those who engage in subsistence solely for
sustenance.
39. See FIENUP-RIORDAN, supra note 15, at 309-11.
40. Id. at 311-12.
41. Id. at 312.
42. Id. at 318-20.
43. Id. at 325-26.
44. Dyer, supra note 35, at 68.
45. See Palinkas et al., Community Patterns, supra note 36, at 1519-22
(concluding that Alaska Natives were particularly vulnerable to depression as a
result of the spill when compared to non-Natives); Palinkas et al., Socia Cultural,
and Psychological Impacts, supra note 36, at 7-10 (finding that the spill was
significantly associated with general anxiety disorder and post-traumatic stress
disorder among Alaska Natives).
46. See Dyer, supra note 35, at 75-85; Dyer et al., supra note 4, at 118-23.
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Much as rights to subsistence as sustenance are ultimately
possessed by the individual, rights to subsistence as culture are only
understandable as group rights. As one author has observed:
A cultural right is a group right, for by its very nature culture is
a communion of its members rather than the sum of the
attitudes and life-projects of the various individuals within the
group. Just as one would not understand [an] orchestra, its
success and its failure, in terms of the success and failure of
individual members, so one would not understand culture in
terms of the attitudes of the individual members. The argument
for cultural rights cannot, therefore, be understood in terms of
individual rights. It is within groups that constitutive narratives
(cultures) are produced and through groups that sense is made
of the social world.47
This claim is particularly valid in the context of Alaska Native
subsistence, where emphasis is placed on community stewardship
over resources and redistribution of those resources for the better-
ment of the group, as opposed to some notion of individual
ownership and profit. 4s
These two conceptions of subsistence, as sustenance and as
culture,49 are not mutually exclusive. Instead, in some sense they
47. Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic
Minorities, 67 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 615, 658 (1991).
48. See FIENuP-RIORDAN, supra note 15, at 311-16 (assessing the impact of
subsistence disruption on the traditional methods of exchange of goods and
services among the Alaskan Yup'ik).
49. A third characterization of subsistence is as an alternative economic system
by which more than just the minimal needs of subsistence users are met. See John
A. Kruse, Alaska Inupiat Subsistence and Wage Employment Patterns: Understand-
ing Individual Choice, 50 HuM. ORGANIZATION 317 (1991) (concluding that, at
least among the Inupiat of northern Alaska, many Natives choose to engage in a
subsistence economy even though wage employment alternatives are available).
For example, one commentator acquainted with subsistence activities has theorized
that subsistence practices act as a means of production, distribution, and exchange
of goods. BERGER, supra note 10, at 56. Others have noted that Alaska Natives
place a high value on material security and therefore tend to eschew what they
regard as the enormous risks of relying exclusively on wage employment. See, e.g.,
Kruse, supra, at 317 ("[M]any Alaska Natives... perceive hunting and fishing to
be the most secure economic base."); Rinaldi, supra note 14, at 151 ("[The] desire
to safeguard material security would account, in part, for the hesitation of northern
communities to embrace high risk, high opportunity cash alternatives."). It is
perhaps for this reason that Congress, in ANTLCA, indicated that subsistence is
essential not only to rural Alaskans' physical well-being, but to their economic
existence as well. 16 U.S.C. § 3111(1) (1994). Congress further defined
subsistence to include barter, sharing for personal or family consumption, and
customary trade. Id. § 3113. Nonetheless, for purposes of this Note, what might
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represent a complex, symbiotic relationship in which sustenance
and culture rely on one another to define Native life. On one
hand, Alaska Natives' spiritual relationship toward the land"
dictates that only those resources necessary for the community's
physical well-being should be put to use.5' In this way, subsistence
as culture reinforces subsistence as sustenance.5 2 On the other
hand, Alaska Natives' view of the land may be a consequence of
the demands of Alaska's harsh seasonal climate. Perhaps perish-
able resources traditionally were not used for profit because long-
term physical survival depended upon their continued availability.
In this way, subsistence as sustenance may have acted as the
genesis of subsistence as culture.
No matter which of these views is adopted, the interplay
between subsistence as sustenance and subsistence as culture is
surely a critical element of Native identity. To recognize the
former while neglecting the latter is to ignore the central compo-
nents of Native life. Thus, the word "subsistence" alone, with its
bare connotation of material survival, is perhaps a flawed means of
understanding Alaska Natives' use of natural resources. Current
attempts to define legal subsistence rights founder due to the
disparity between English terminology and the realities of Native
life, which has made subsistence arguably "'[Alaska's] most volatile
political issue."'' 3
Apart from wholly definitional concerns, important public
policy considerations justify using Alaska law to protect subsistence
be termed "subsistence as economics" is sufficiently contained within the concepts
of subsistence as sustenance and subsistence as culture. The role of economics in
fulfilling the physical needs of subsistence users fits within the concept of
subsistence as sustenance, and the social relationships emerging from such an
economic system fit within the concept of subsistence as culture.
50. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 10, at 75 ("Natives believe the land should
be passed on to their children. This spiritual and cultural relationship with the
land is the bedrock of Native culture.").
51. See FIENUP-RIORDAN, supra note 15, at 312 ("By definition a subsistence
harvest can have no surplus.").
52. See BERGER, supra note 10, at 68 ("For Alaska Natives, health and well-
being are functions of the material and spiritual nourishment that the land
provides ....").
53. Kancewick & Smith, supra note 9, at 649 (quoting Doogan, State Board
Fishing for Miracle of Understanding Subsistence, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Nov.
30, 1990, at Bi).
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as culture and/or encouraging federal law to do so." First,
environmental policy-makers in Alaska might benefit from
observing Native resource management practices and incorporating
those that are useful into the state's own environmental protection
schemes." As such practices are inherently related to subsistence
culture, the failure to remedy harm to Native culture might impair
the efficacy of Native resource management systems, thereby
unnecessarily eliminating a valuable source of innovative environ-
mental protection strategies.56
Second, both Native and non-Native Alaskans suffer as a result
of injuries to Native culture. The strains placed on Native lifestyles
due to loss of subsistence resources may result in self-destructive
behavior such as suicide or alcoholism among individual Natives.
Efforts to assimilate Native communities by failing to protect
subsistence as culture "may be largely unavailing with respect to
the [Native] community itself and unintentionally destructive with
respect to members of that community."" Harm to one segment
of society affects all members, whether directly, through factors
such as increased crime, or indirectly, through increased welfare
burdens and lost productivity due to poverty. Therefore, safe-
guarding Alaska Native culture may reduce social costs visited
upon other Alaskans by these types of harmful behavior.
Third, affording greater protection to subsistence as culture
under Alaska law would gradually eliminate the current dual
54. Given the special trust relationship between the federal government and
Native Americans, see infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text, federal law may
be the more effective, and perhaps more appropriate, means by which to protect
Native culture.
55. For a discussion of aboriginal resource management systems generally, see
Randy Kapashesit & Murray Klippenstein, Aboriginal Group Rights and
Environmental Protection, 36 McGILL LU. 925, 932-37 (1991).
56. See, e.g., David S. Case, Subsistence and Self-Determination: Can Alaska
Natives Have a More "Effective Voice"?, 60 U. COLo. L. REv. 1009, 1034-35
(1989) (observing that, absent the scientific, legal, and political efforts of Native
organizations which operate based on cultural practices, "the fate of the bowhead
whale would no doubt otherwise have been decided without the wisdom of the
Inupiat").
57. See, e.g., Michie, supra note 16, at 80 n.4; Kevin J Worthen, One Small Step
for Courts, One Giant Leap for Group Rights: Accommodating the Associational
Role of "Intimate" Government Entities, 71 N.C. L. REv. 595, 628-29 (1993).
58. Kevin J Worthen, The Role of Local Governments in Striking the Proper
Balance Between Individualism and Communitarianism: Lessons for and from
Americans, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 475, 494 (1993).
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wildlife management system, allowing the state to regain manage-
ment authority over public lands in Alaska that are currently
governed by federal regulations under ANILCA. ANILCA allows
the Alaska government to control the management of federally
held lands in Alaska, provided that certain criteria are met.59 This
reform would decrease both the amount and the cost of litigation
over subsistence rights, as citizens of the state would be subject
only to one set of regulations.
Given the costs associated with harm to Native culture and the
centrality of subsistence to its maintenance, Alaska should be eager
to alleviate damage to subsistence as culture as part of its general
responsibility to protect the well-being of its citizens. However, as
Part I will demonstrate, current law has been ineffective in its
efforts to remedy cultural harm.
III. EXISTING SUBSISTENCE LAW: THE FAILURE OF CURRENT
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
The legal regimes presently governing subsistence rights in
Alaska can be divided into four categories: (1) those marked by an
absence of both rights and remedies to protect subsistence as
culture; (2) those that contain inadequate rights and insufficient
remedies; (3) those that fail to confer adequate rights only; and (4)
those that fail to offer sufficient remedies only. No matter what
the flaw may be, whether one of right, of remedy or of both,
Alaska's current legal regimes are unsuited to address harm to
subsistence as culture.
A. Absence of Rights and Remedies: Federal Trust Responsi-
bilities Toward Native Americans
The preservation of Native cultures has long been recognized
as a legitimate object of federal concern.60 In particular, the
federal government possesses trust responsibilities toward Native
American tribes based upon the tribes' political status as "na-
tions,, 61 a trust relationship considered to be "a bedrock principle
59. The nature of this dual management system and its policy implications are
addressed infra, at notes 71-97 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee
Nation v: Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
61. See, e.g., Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559 ("The Indian nations had always
been considered as distinct, independent political communities.... The very term
'nation,' so generally applied to them, means 'a people distinct from others."').
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of federal Indian law."'62 These special trust responsibilities
extend to the relationship between the federal government and
Alaska Natives' and impose a fiduciary duty on the federal
government to protect Native subsistence culture. For instance, in
People of Togiak v. United States,64 the court observed that the
obligations imposed upon the federal government by its trust
relationship with Alaska Natives included "duties so to regulate as
to protect the subsistence resources of Indian communities ... and
to preserve such communities as distinct cultural entities against
interference by the States."'  Thus, this unique relationship places
the burden on federal law to safeguard subsistence as culture.66
The protection provided by this trust relationship between the
federal government and Native Americans is enhanced in two ways.
First, the statutes that protect Native subsistence and create the
trust relationship are considered Indian legislation. As such, any
62. Kancewick & Smith, supra note 9, at 653 n.31.
63. See, e.g., North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 611-13 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d 950, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1978); People of Togiak v.
United States, 470 F. Supp. 423,428 (D.D.C. 1979); CASE, supra note 6, at 293-94;
Eric Smith & Mary Kancewick, The Tribal Status of Alaska Natives, 61 U. COLO.
L. REv. 455, 514-15 (1990).
64. 470 F. Supp. 423 (D.D.C. 1979).
65. Id. at 428 (emphasis added). The federal government's trust responsibili-
ties were used as evidence that, in passing the Marine Mammal Protection Act
("MMPA"), Congress intended to preempt the field of marine mammal protection,
and, therefore, Department of the Interior regulations transferring the power to
regulate hunting of such mammals to the State of Alaska were invalid. Id. at 428-
30.
66. Congress has sought to fulfill this responsibility in various ways. Such
attempts include Title VIII of ANILCA, 16 U.S.C. § 3111 (1994) (indicating that
subsistence is "essential to Native ... cultural existence"); the Alaska Native
exemption to the MMPA, see 16 U.S.C.A. § 1371(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1995);
Katelnikoff v. United States Dep't of Interior, 657 F. Supp. 659, 666 (D. Alaska
1986) (noting that Congress's concern in enacting the Native exemption was "the
preservation of traditional aspects of native culture and lifestyle"); 118 CoNG.
REc. 25,258 (1972) (statement of Sen. Stevens) ("If this exception were not
included, Alaskan Natives would lose their traditional way of life, the way they
have lived for centuries.. . ."); and the liability provisions of the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Authorization Act ("TAPA.A"), see 43 U.S.C.A. § 1653 (West 1986 &
Supp. 1995) (providing strict liability for harm to natural resources used for
subsistence purposes if such damage resulted from activities along the trans-
Alaskan pipeline right-of-way); Jordan v. Amerada Hess Corp., 479 F. Supp. 573,
576 (D. Alaska 1979) (observing that the TAPAA damages provision was enacted,
in part, to protect the subsistence lifestyle of Alaska Natives), affd sub nom.
Heppner v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 665 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1981).
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ambiguities in them are construed in favor of the Natives.67
Second, government actions under such statutes must take cultural
concerns into account. For example, one court has recognized that
the government's trust responsibilities serve three purposes: (1) to
"preclude the use of environmental statutes to undermine subsis-
tence cultures;" (2) to "require[] [federal executive officials] to be
cognizant of the needs of [Native] culture;" and (3) to demand
"rigorous application of the environmental statutes to protect the
species necessary for [Natives'] subsistence."' However, the trust
relationship alone is insufficient to protect subsistence as culture.
There are two limitations that prevent it from independently
remedying cultural harm. Most importantly, these responsibilities
arise only when the government explicitly recognizes them in its
enactments. 69 Thus, there must be a statutory trigger before the
67. See, e.g., People of the Village of Gambell v. Clark, 746 F.2d 572,581 (9th
Cir. 1984) (stating that Title VIII of ANILCA is Indian legislation), rev'd in part
sub nor. Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987); 126
CONG. REC. 29,279 (1980) (statement of Rep. Udall) (same); Smith & Kancewick,
supra note 63, at 514-15 (stating that statutes pertaining to Alaska Natives,
including Title VIII of ANILCA, are "Indian laws").
The ambiguity in the statute must be real, however, in order for this rule of
statutory construction to apply. See Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell,
480 U.S. 531, 555 (1987). The rule of construction therefore does not 'permit
reliance on ambiguities that do not exist; nor does it permit disregard of the clearly
expressed intent of Congress."' Id. (quoting South Carolina v. Catawba Indian
Tribe, 476 U.S. 498, 506 (1986)).
68. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 344 (D.D.C.) (North
Slope Borough 1), affd in part and rev'd in part, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(North Slope Borough I). The district court in North Slope Borough I held that
the Secretary of the Interior violated these responsibilities by failing to comply
with the Endangered Species Act in the regulation of oil leases in the Beaufort
Sea. Id. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed in
part, holding that the Secretary had given "purposeful attention to the special
needs of the [Natives]" and that such attention was sufficient to fulfill the
government's trust responsibilities. North Slope Borough 11, 642 F.2d at 612. The
court of appeals' determination that the Secretary had given sufficient consider-
ation to Native needs does not abrogate the general duty to take such concerns
into account. It simply means that the government's trust responsibilities were
fulfilled in this particular instance.
69. See North Slope Borough 11, 642 F.2d at 611 ("'[A] trust responsibility can
only arise from a statute, treaty, or executive order[,]' ... [and] the United States
bore no fiduciary responsibility to Native Americans under a statute which
contained no specific provision in the terms of the statute.") (quoting North Slope
Borough 1, 486 F. Supp. at 344). The North Slope Borough II court appeared to
take this limitation quite seriously, noting that the extinguishment of all Alaska
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federal government incurs these duties. In addition, these trust
responsibilities are not absolute; they may be overridden by
competing national or international policy concerns."
In short, federal trust responsibilities toward Alaska Natives,
standing alone, provide neither rights nor remedies that enable
federal law to redress harm to Alaska Native culture. Instead, they
are dependent on predicate rights or remedies that not only must
be created by statute, but also must expressly imbue Natives with
rights and remedies arising from the federal government's trust
responsibility. However, as will be shown, existing statutes
purporting to grant such rights and remedies inadequately protect
subsistence as culture, thereby rendering the federal government's
trust responsibilities toward Alaska Natives a hollow means of
protection.
B. A Failure of Both Rights and Remedies: ANILCA
Enacted in response to the failure of both the Secretary of the
Interior and the State of Alaska to protect Native subsistence
adequately under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
("ANCSA"), 71 ANILCA72 is the most significant federal enact-
Native aboriginal hunting and fishing rights by the enactment of the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act ("ANCSA"), see 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (1988), may also have
extinguished any federal trust responsibility toward Alaska Native subsistence.
North Slope Borough I1, 642 F.2d at 612 n.151.
70. See, e.g., North Slope Borough 11, 642 F.2d at 612-13 (holding that the trust
responsibility allows the government to balance its competing interests so long as
the special needs of Alaska Natives are considered); Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d
950, 956-57 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (considering the United States' foreign policy
concerns to sufficiently outweigh the federal government's trust responsibilities to
Alaska Natives); CASE, supra note 6, at 293 ("[W]hen pitted against... competing
public interests of the United States, the federal trust responsibility [is] an
important but not overriding consideration. When pitted directly against the
international interests of the United States.... the responsibility has been held
insufficient to warrant court intervention. .. ").
71. Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1629(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). ANCSA extinguished all aboriginal title
to land in Alaska and also extinguished all existing aboriginal hunting and fishing
rights. See 43 U.S.C. § 1603(b). Congress believed that Native subsistence
interests would be adequately protected under ANCSA by the Secretary of the
Interior and the State of Alaska. See CASE, supra note 6, at 294-95. When such
protection was found lacking, ANILCA was enacted as a response. Id. at 295-99.
72. Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C.A. §§ 3111-26 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995)).
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ment governing Alaskan subsistence. Moreover, because of the
breadth of its applicability,73 ANILCA has exerted a strong
influence on subsistence law in other legal regimes. 4
ANILCA was enacted for two purposes. First, it was designed
"to fulfill the policies and purposes of [ANCSA],"75 namely, to
provide for an immediate, fair, and certain settlement of aboriginal
land claims without litigation or the creation of rights, privileges or
obligations based on permanent racial classifications. 6 Second,
Congress intended "to provide the opportunity for rural residents
engaged in a subsistence way of life to do SO. ''77 ANILCA thus
represents an attempt to strike a balance between protecting the
subsistence way of life and avoiding both costly litigation and the
use of racial classifications to resolve land disputes.
Three of ANILCA's provisions are crucial to its efforts to
accomplish these goals. First, ANILCA defines subsistence in
terms of the customary and traditional uses of wildlife by rural
Alaskans." Second, it creates a preference for subsistence uses by
establishing two tiers of regulations. In the first tier, where fish and
game populations are sufficiently numerous to satisfy all subsistence
uses, regulations must grant a priority to subsistence uses over all
73. ANILCA governs fish and game management on all public lands in
Alaska. 16 U.S.C. § 3114. Public lands are defined as all lands, waters, and
interests over which the United States holds title. See id. § 3102(1)-(3). Public
lands in Alaska account for approximately 218 million of Alaska's 365 million
acres of land. The other lands belong either to the state (103 million acres) or to
Natives (44 million acres). See Boardman, supra note 6, at 1003 n.41.
74. In particular, ANILCA has had a profound influence on the evolution of
Alaska's state subsistence law. This is due in substantial part to the fact that
ANILCA permits Alaska to retain management authority over public lands if it
enacts fish and game regulations consistent with ANILCA. See 16 U.S.C. § 3115.
For a more detailed discussion of ANILCA's influence on Alaska law, see infra
notes 99-125 and accompanying text.
75. 16 U.S.C. § 3111(4).
76. See 43 U.S.C. § 1601(a)-(b) (1988).
77. 16 U.S.C. § 3112(1).
78. The definition of subsistence reads in part:
As used in this Act, the term "subsistence uses" means the customary and
traditional uses by rural Alaska residents of wild, renewable resources for
direct personal or family consumption as food, shelter, fuel, clothing, tools, or
transportation; for the making and selling of handicraft articles out of
nonedible byproducts of fish and wildlife resources taken for personal or
family consumption; for barter, or sharing for personal or family consumption;




others.79 In the second, where such populations are insufficient to
satisfy all subsistence uses, limitations may be placed on subsistence
uses according to various criteria." Finally, ANILCA provides a
remedy for violations of the subsistence preference by authorizing
a private civil action against the state or the federal government in
which the plaintiff may demand enforcement of ANILCA's require-




ANILCA serves the important function of declaring that
subsistence as culture is worthy of legal protection. First, it
explicitly states that "the continuation of the opportunity for
subsistence uses ...is essential to Native physical, economic,
traditional, and cultural existence."'  Second, by permitting
preliminary injunctive relief, ANILCA suggests that harm to
subsistence may constitute an irreparable injury sufficient to
warrant this equitable remedy," Third, ANILCA encourages
private actions to enforce its provisions by awarding attorney's fees
to prevailing plaintiffs. 4 Despite these positive attributes, AN-
ILCA nevertheless inadequately protects subsistence as culture,
both in its rights and in its remedies.
79. The subsistence preference provides, in part, that "[e]xcept as otherwise
provided in this Act and other Federal laws, the taking on public lands of fish and
wildlife for nonwasteful subsistence uses shall be accorded priority over the taking
on such lands of fish and wildlife for other purposes." ld. § 3114.
80. The subsistence preference provision continues:
Whenever it is necessary to restrict the taking of populations of fish and
wildlife on [public] lands for subsistence uses in order to protect the
continued viability of such populations, or to continue such uses, such
priority shall be implemented through appropriate limitations based on
the application of the following criteria:
(1) customary and direct dependence upon the populations as
the mainstay of livelihood;
(2) local residency; and
(3) the availability of alternative resources.
Id § 3114.
81. Md § 3117.
82. Id. § 3111(1) (emphasis added).
83. See Id. § 3117. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
has held that cultural injuries are sufficient to establish irreparable harm and
warrant preliminary injunctive relief. See Native Village of Quinhagak v. United
States, 35 F.3d 388, 394 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that, to obtain a preliminary
injunction, Native plaintiffs "needed to prove nothing more" than that the
challenged regulations would "interfere with their way of life and cultural
identity").
84. 16 U.S.C. § 3117.
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1. ANILCA's Rights. ANILCA's rights creates a significant
tension between subsistence as sustenance and subsistence as
culture. As one pair of commentators has observed:
The tension embodied in ANILCA between the minimalist and
cultural conceptions of subsistence is reflected in the use of the
terms "rural Alaska resident" and "customary and traditional"
in the definition of "subsistence uses." By rendering non-Native
rural residents equally eligible for the same "subsistence"
priority, Congress necessarily undercut its ability to fully protect
the cultural component of subsistence; in requiring state and
federal regulations to reflect customary and traditional practices,
Congress forced consideration of that very component.'
To a certain degree, ANILCA safeguards Natives' rights to
subsistence as culture by protecting "customary and traditional"
uses of resources, as well as in its status as "Indian legislation" for
purposes of statutory construction.86 However, the shortcoming
in ANILCA's rights arises not only because non-Native rural
residents are entitled to a subsistence preference, but also because
Native non-rural residents, even if they can prove that they engage
in subsistence for cultural reasons, are not entitled to this prefer-
ence. In distinguishing between rural and non-rural residents,
rather than between Native and non-Native residents, ANILCA's
provisions are wholly incompatible with the congressionally
expressed goal of protecting Native cultural existence.'
David S. Case argues that the move away from granting
subsistence rights exclusively to Natives in one sense "represent[s]
a diminution of Native rights, but in another .. .represent[s]
incorporation of Native values into non-Native culture."88 While
both of his claims may have merit, Case is still unable to avoid the
distinction between Native and non-Native cultures. While
subsistence values may be increasingly incorporated into non-
Native life, they simply do not represent a core cultural identity for
non-Natives, as they do for Natives. Mary Kancewick and Eric
Smith support this conclusion by observing:
85. Kancewick & Smith, supra note 9, at 662.
86. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. Moreover, such a distinction is
conceptually unsound. See Kancewick & Smith, supra note 9, at 669 ("It is
difficult conceptually to determine the 'customs and traditions' of a mixed
community of Natives and non-Natives .....
88. Case, supra note 6, at 279.
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This is not to say that non-Natives do not engage in what they
perceive to be subsistence-the taking of fish and game for
personal sustenance. This is also not to say that there are not
families who have chosen to live this way for perhaps three
generations or that there are not individual non-Natives who
have come to identify themselves with this minimalist way of life,
finding in it a zen sort of richness. But it is to say that Native
subsistence and non-Native subsistence are not the same
thing.s9
Defining subsistence in terms of "rural residency" rather than
in terms of Native status may have resulted from political pressure
from Alaska officials, who believed that granting a Native-based
subsistence preference would violate state constitutional provi-
sions.90 Because Alaska would be required to adopt regulations
consistent with ANILCA's subsistence preference in order to retain
management authority over public lands,91 the preference's
consistency with the Alaska Constitution was an important concern.
Ironically, the effort was futile, as the Alaska Supreme Court held
that the state's regulations based on rural residency violated the
Alaska Constitution. 2 Thus, ANILCA's segregation of rural and
non-rural residents has fallen victim to the very constitutional
scrutiny that it had hoped to avoid. This is not to say, of course,
that a classification based on Native status would be entirely free
from constitutional scrutiny,93 but such a distinction would have
at least fulfilled Congress's original intent of protecting Natives'
cultural right to subsistence.
2. ANILCA's Remedies. One court has characterized
ANILCA as "a law without a bite" because it "does little more
89. Kancewick & Smith, supra note 9, at 652.
90. See id. at 645 n.5, 658 n.62.
91. See 16 U.S.C. § 3115(d) (1994).
92. McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989) (holding that a subsistence
preference for rural residents violates sections 3, 15, and 17 of Article VIII of the
Alaska Constitution). There is currently a challenge to ANILCA's own rural
residency requirement under the federal equal protection clause, although this
litigation has been momentarily deterred by the plaintiff's failure to demonstrate
his standing to sue. See McDowell v. United States, 32 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 1994).
For a detailed discussion of the relationship between ANILCA's rural residency
provision and the right to travel and its bearing on ANILCA's constitutionality,
see Gudgell, supra note 26.
93. At the very least, however, such a distinction in a federal law, enacted
under Congress's plenary power over Indian affairs, would be immune from attack
under the Alaska Constitution. See infra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
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than provide a broad outline of what uses must be preferred over
others."94  For example, ANILCA does not, of its own force,
provide remedies for violations of the regulations that implement
the subsistence preference. Such remedies are apparently left to
the rulemaking authority and discretion of the Secretary of Interior
or to the State of Alaska. Instead, the "sole Federal judicial
remedy" provided by ANILCA is a civil suit against either the state
or the federal government to require the submission of regulations
consistent with ANILCA's subsistence priority.95 While this
language does not prohibit rural Alaskans from relying on a
"subsistence defense" to federal criminal prosecutions,96 AN-
ILCA's only affirmative mandate is that regulations managing
wildlife on public lands give priority to subsistence. It does not
require that individual instances of harm to subsistence, particularly
to subsistence as culture, actually be remedied.
In sum, ANILCA's inability to protect subsistence as culture
adequately is rooted in its reluctance to view subsistence as a group
right of Alaska Natives. In its efforts to avoid using Native status
as the touchstone of ANILCA's subsistence preference, Congress
employed the necessarily culture-neutral classification of rural
versus urban residency. Such an approach, based as it is on
individual rights, may protect subsistence as sustenance, but it
absolutely fails to recognize that subsistence as culture is a group
concept that can be protected only through a group right.97
Further, the lack of legal remedies, such as damages, leaves Natives
without any means of recompense for actual damage to their
94. United States v. Alexander, 938 F.2d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 1991).
95. 16 U.S.C. § 3117(c) (1994). This provision has been interpreted to mean
that ANILCA "prohibits courts in civil proceedings from awarding relief not listed
in the statute, such as damages." Alexander, 938 F.2d at 948.
96. Alexander, 938 F.2d at 948. In Alexander, the defendants had been
charged with violating the Lacey Act, a federal criminal statute prohibiting the
transportation in interstate or foreign commerce of fish or wildlife taken or sold
in violation of state law. Id. at 945. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the defendants could challenge the state regulations that
provided the predicate for the Lacey Act violation on the grounds that they were
inconsistent with ANILCA. Id. at 948. However, this defense is available only to
rural Alaskans who establish that their use of the wildlife in question was
"customary and traditional" within the meaning of ANILCA. Id. Alexander
therefore recognizes that subsistence users within the meaning of ANILCA cannot
be punished criminally for engaging in subsistence activities.
97. See supra notes 25-53 and accompanying text.
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subsistence culture. Through both its unsuitable rural resident
preference and its inability to provide compensation for specific
instances of harm, ANILCA fails to provide either effective rights
or useful remedies to redress harm to Native subsistence culture.
C. Failures in Rights Alone: Alaskan Subsistence Law and
Federal Maritime Law
Unlike ANILCA, some laws addressing subsistence issues fail
to give any legal effect whatsoever to the concept of subsistence as
culture. These regimes are characterized by two groups, each with
a distinct weakness. First, Alaska's current subsistence manage-
ment provisions9" fail to provide rights that redress harm to Native
culture caused by increased access to subsistence resources.
Second, federal maritime law as interpreted in the Exxon Valdez
litigation denies Natives access to sufficient means of relief to
recover for the depletion of subsistence resources by pollution.
1. Alaskan Subsistence Law. The evolution of Alaskan
subsistence law has been quite turbulent.99 In 1978, in anticipation
of ANILCA, the Alaska legislature passed a subsistence statute
that traced both ANILCA's two-tiered approach to wildlife
regulation and its definition of subsistence.' However, this
statute did not limit subsistence uses to rural residents. In a
successful effort to comply with ANILCA and retain management
authority over public lands in Alaska, the state instead adopted
various regulations linking the subsistence preference to rural
residency.'" In 1985, the Alaska Supreme Court invalidated
these regulations in Madison v. State Department of Fish &
Game,"° holding that the term "customary and traditional" in the
regulations referred to uses of subsistence resources, not users.
Therefore, the regulations did not restrict the subsistence prefer-
ence to rural areas and were inconsistent with the statutes under
which they were enacted."W Consequently, Alaska's subsistence
98. The principal statutory provisions are Alaska Statutes sections 16.05.258
(1992), 16.05.259 (1992), and 16.05.940(32) (1994).
99. For a more detailed discussion of its history, see Bobby v. Alaska, 718 F.
Supp. 764, 766-68 (D. Alaska 1989).
100. Act effective Oct. 10, 1978, ch. 151, 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws (2d Sess.).
101. See Bobby, 718 F. Supp. at 767.
102. 696 P.2d 168 (Alaska 1985).
103. Id. at 174.
[Vol. 12:2
GROUP RIGHTS THEORY
program was no longer in compliance with ANILCA. To avoid
losing control over its public lands, the Alaska legislature quickly
passed a new statute that retained the former law's two-tiered
regulation structure but also explicitly contained a rural residency
requirement." In turn, the Alaska Supreme Court annulled this
requirement in McDowell v. State."
Since McDowell, the taking of wildlife in Alaska has been
governed by a dual management system: federal regulations
promulgated under ANILCA govern wildlife uses on public
lands,"6 while state regulations enacted under Alaska's subsis-
tence provisions control wildlife uses on other lands. This state of
affairs has produced several undesirable consequences. In
particular, it has led to two notable protracted litigations: one
concerning whether Alaska's navigable waters fall under AN-
ILCA's definition of public lands,37 and another addressing
whether the federal government has the authority to regulate
wildlife use on Alaska's public lands in the absence of an Alaska
subsistence statute that complies with ANILCA." As of this
writing, the federal government is authorized to promulgate
subsistence regulations for Alaska's public lands and for those
navigable waters in which the United States possesses an interest
by virtue of the reserved water rights doctrine. 9
Moreover, the evolution of Alaskan subsistence law in McDo-
well and subsequent cases exhibits a fundamental antagonism to
protecting subsistence as culture. The McDowell court relied solely
on the conception of subsistence as sustenance by, among other
ways, citing data that purported to demonstrate that a substantial
percentage of urban Alaska residents rely on hunting and fishing
in order to obtain basic food, whereas numerous rural residents do
104. Act effective June 1, 1986, ch. 52,1986 Alaska Sess. Laws; see also Bobby,
718 F. Supp. at 768.
105. 785 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989) (holding that the "rural residency" requirement
for protection of subsistence uses contained in 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws 52 violated
sections 3, 15, and 17 of Article VIII of the Alaska Constitution).
106. See supra note 73.
107. See Native Village of Quinhagak v. United States, 35 F.3d 388 (9th Cir.
1994).
108. See Alaska v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d 549 (9th Cir.), cert denied sub nom. Alaska
State Legislature v. Alaska, 64 U.S.L.W. 3240 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1995).
109. See Babbitt, 54 F.3d at 552-54. Further, "the federal agencies that
administer the subsistence priority are responsible for identifying those waters."
Id. at 554.
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not."' In particular, this data fails to address whether the urban
residents who engage in subsistence practices are Natives doing so
for cultural reasons, and whether the rural residents who do not
rely on such practices are non-Natives with no cultural impetus to
lead a subsistence lifestyle."'
While Alaska's current subsistence statute, Alaska Statutes
section 16.05.258(b), is somewhat similar to ANILCA, the rights
that it currently provides are wholly incapable of protecting
subsistence as culture. For instance, although it mirrors ANILCA's
two-tier approach to wildlife regulation,"' section 16.05.259
explicitly rejects the "subsistence defense" permitted by AN-
ILCA." More importantly, after McDowell, the Alaska statute
differs significantly in its definition of "subsistence uses." Not only
did the Alaska Supreme Court eliminate the rural residency
requirement in McDowell," but, in an earlier case, it also broad-
110. McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1989).
111. For another critique of McDowell's exclusive reliance on the concept of
subsistence as sustenance, see Kancewick & Smith, supra note 9, at 671-72.
112. The first tier, Alaska Statutes section 16.05.258(b)(1)-(3), which is designed
to govern situations in which the wildlife population is sufficient to satisfy all
subsistence uses, is actually divided into three subcategories. The first applies to
situations in which all consumptive uses can be satisfied; the second governs
circumstances in which all subsistence uses and some, but not all, other consump-
tive uses can be satisfied; and the third regulates situations in which all subsistence
uses, but no other uses, can be satisfied. Each of the three subcategories of the
first tier accords subsistence uses a priority.
The statute's second tier applies when the wildlife population is insufficient
to satisfy all subsistence uses. See ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.258(b)(4) (1992). In
such circumstances, other consumptive uses are prohibited, and subsistence uses
are regulated according to criteria similar to ANILCA's second tier. Id.; 16 U.S.C.
§ 3114 (1994); see also supra note 80 and accompanying text. However, as of May
1995, the Alaska statute is not completely in line with ANILCA. In State v.
Kenaitze Indian Tribe, 894 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1995), the Alaska Supreme Court
held that the second factor to be examined in according a subsistence priori-
ty-"the proximity of the domicile of the subsistence user to the stock or
population," ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.258(b)(4)(B)(ii) (1992)-was unconstitutional
under McDowell.
113. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.259 (1992) ("In a prosecution for the
taking of fish or game in violation of a statute or regulation, it is not a defense
that the taking was done for subsistence uses.") with United States v. Alexander,
938 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1991) (permitting criminal defendants to assert subsistence
use as a defense to their federal prosecution). Alexander is discussed in detail at
supra note 96.
114. On remand in McDowell, the superior court apparently severed the rural
residency requirement from Alaska Statutes section 16.05.940(32) and left the
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ly interpreted the terms "customary and traditional" to allow
greater access to resources than the comparable terms in AN-
ILCA. 5
In State v. Morry,"6 the Alaska Supreme Court continued
this trend by holding that the terms "customary and traditional"
define the specific wildlife populations subject to subsistence uses
and the post-harvest use of those populations, rather than the
methods of harvest themselves. 7 This interpretation is utterly
incompatible with the concept of subsistence as culture, as now
"there are no statutory standards for determining those individuals
who are ineligible to participate in subsistence hunting and fishing.
,. . [AJll Alaskans are [now] eligible .... ."" In reaching this
conclusion, the Morry court ignored the fact that "customary and
traditional" methods of harvest are often the hallmark of subsis-
tence as culture.119
Alaska law's inability to protect subsistence as culture is
essentially due to its nearly exclusive emphasis on individual rights,
of which McDowell is particularly poignant evidence. In McDowell,
the supreme court declared that Alaska's subsistence law serves
two primary purposes: to allow individuals to obtain the basic
necessities of life and to aid communities whose residents depend
on subsistence to live."2 Yet, because "communities are merely
the collective sum of . . . residents,"'' the statute has only a
single purpose: to protect subsistence as sustenance. Given that
goal, the court could confidently declare that "[a] classification
remainder of the statute intact. See State v. Morry, 836 P.2d 358, 366 (Alaska
1992). After McDowell, Alaska's statute therefore defines "subsistence uses" as:
the noncommercial, customary and traditional uses of wild, renewable
resources [rural residency requirement stricken by the McDowell court]
for direct personal or family consumption as food, shelter, fuel, clothing,
tools, or transportation, for the making and selling of handicraft articles
out of nonedible by-products of fish and wildlife resources taken for
personal or family consumption, and for the customary trade, barter, or
sharing for personal or family consumption ....
ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.940(32) (1992).
115. See, e.g., Madison v. State Dep't of Fish & Game, 696 P.2d 168, 176
(Alaska 1985).
116. 836 P.2d 358 (Alaska 1992).
117. Id. at 369-70.
118. Id. at 368 (emphasis added).
119. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 10, at 48-55.




scheme employing individual characteristics would be less invasive
of [state constitutional] values and much more apt to accomplish
the purpose of the statute than the urban-rural criterion.""
Were the court to approach the identical statute with a group rights
point of view, it would surely reach another result. Under the
subsistence as culture approach, the importance of subsistence to
Alaska Native culture would be ample justification for an alternate
classification scheme, one that allowed Natives a priority over all
others in subsistence activities.
In sum, Alaska's subsistence statutes render all Alaskans
individually eligible as subsistence users."' However, not all
Alaskans have a primary cultural connection to subsistence
practices, as Native groups do."M Inevitably, as Alaska's popula-
tion continues to grow, expanding access to and pressure on
subsistence resources, the cultural harm suffered by Alaska Natives
will only continue to increase. Yet, Alaska law currently contains
no mechanism for avoiding these repercussions."
2. Federal Maritime Law. Federal maritime law governing
pollution also fails to protect subsistence as culture, as cogently
illustrated by a recent decision in the Exxon Valdez litigation. In
In re Exxon Valdez, 26 a class of individual Alaska Natives sought
122. Id. at 11 (emphasis added). The Alaska Supreme Court has recently
reaffirmed the importance of Alaskans' individual subsistence rights by striking
down another legislative attempt to classify subsistence users by a residential
criterion. In State v. Kenaitze Indian Tribe, 894 P2d 632 (Alaska 1995), the court
held that basing the subsistence priority in Alaska Statutes section 16.05.258(b)(4)
on "the proximity of the domicile of the subsistence user to the stock or
population" was unconstitutional under McDowell.
123. See State v. Morry, 836 P.2d 358, 368 (Alaska 1992).
124. See supra notes 25-53 and accompanying text.
125. Alaska's subsistence statutes are not alone in their failure to protect
subsistence as culture. Recovery for cultural harm as a result of oil pollution has
also been difficult under Alaska law. For instance, the Alaska Act, a statute
governing the release of hazardous substances into state waters, allows recovery
for personal injury, property damage, and many forms of economic losses, but not
for damage to subsistence resources. ALAsKA STAT. § 46.03.824 (1991)
("Damages include but are not limited to injury to or loss of persons or property,
real or personal, loss of income, loss of the means of producing income, or the loss
of an economic benefit."). While this statute may allow recovery for subsistence
as sustenance as an "economic benefit," it clearly provides no such remedy for
subsistence as culture.
126. No. A89-0095-CV (HRl), Order No. 190, 1994 WL 182856 (D. Alaska
Mar. 23, 1994). The court was sitting in admiralty and, thus, applied federal
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to recover for damage to their subsistence lifestyle arising out of
the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The individuals were unable to recover
from the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund"z by the decision
of the fund's administrator that subsistence damages were not
"economic."" Nevertheless, the Natives proceeded under a
common law theory of public nuisance.129 The court observed
that under this theory, the Natives could recover only if they
proved that the harm they suffered was different in kind from that
suffered by the general public. 30 Then, the court granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendant, holding that the Natives suffered
harm different only in degree, not in kind, from that suffered by
the general public.' In so ruling, the court relied heavily on an
individual rights notion of subsistence. Echoing Morry, the court
declared:
All Alaskans have the right to lead subsistence lifestyles, not just
Alaska Natives. All Alaskans, and not just Alaska Natives, have
the right to obtain and share wild food, enjoy uncontaminated
nature, and cultivate traditional, cultural, spiritual, and psycho-
logical benefits in pristine natural surroundings. Neither the
length of time in which Alaska Natives have practiced a
subsistence lifestyle nor the manner in which it is practiced
makes the Alaska Native subsistence lifestyle unique. These
attributes of the Alaska Native lifestyle only make it different in
degree from the same subsistence lifestyle available to all
Alaskans.ul
The court accepted Exxon's argument that "a fervent environ-
mentalist who adores nature or an avid sport fisherman or hunter
suffered the same injury as the Native Alaskans," and, thus, it held
that the Natives could not maintain a private action for public
nuisance.13
3
As this holding demonstrates, federal maritime law essentially
fails to recognize the Natives' right to remedy harm to their
subsistence culture. The critical step in the court's analysis is the
maritime law.
127. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
128. See Quam, supra note 26, at 200.
129. In re Exxon Valdez, 1994 WL 182856, at *1. The court indicated that the
plaintiff's nuisance theory may have failed regardless of its decision because the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act preempts the federal maritime and common
law of nuisance in the area of water pollution. Id. at *2-3.
130. Id. at *1.
131. Id. at *2, *5.




notion that subsistence is an individual right to sustenance.
Beginning with this premise, as the court did,M the conclusion
that the harm suffered by Alaska Natives is different only in degree
is nearly inescapable. If all Alaskans possess the same rights to use
natural resources for subsistence purposes, then the fact that
Alaska Natives take greater advantage of those rights distinguishes
them from other Alaskans only in degree, not in kind.
However, viewed from a group rights perspective, the court's
decision is questionable. If the court had adopted a different
premise, that subsistence rights are enjoyed by groups, then the
harm suffered by Alaska Natives is indeed different in kind.35
Even if a fervent environmentalist and an avid sportsman rely on
subsistence practices for their physical well-being, the fabric of their
culture is not threatened by the depletion of subsistence resources.
In contrast, the cultural identity of Alaska Natives is irrevocably
linked to subsistence practices, and the damage to them as a group
is qualitatively different from the damage to the general popula-
tion. Thus, if the court were to consider the Native plaintiffs to
possess a group right to subsistence, it would be incorrect to say
that their subsistence lifestyle is not unique.'36
Both Alaska law and federal maritime nuisance law refuse to
recognize subsistence as culture by rejecting the notion that groups
possess subsistence rights over and above those possessed by
individuals. By focusing myopically on subsistence solely as the
individual's right to sustenance, these legal regimes fail to consider
demonstrated, redressable cultural injuries.
D. Failures in Remedies Alone: Endangered Species Statutes and
Federal Oil Pollution Laws.
Unlike many of the laws heretofore analyzed, some bodies of
law do provide rights that are specifically designed to protect
134. The Exxon Valdez court relied explicitly on McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d
1 (Alaska 1989), to establish this premise. Id. at *2 n.6. For a detailed analysis
of McDowell, see Boardman, supra note 6, at 1003-13.
135. See Gallagher, supra note 2, at 588 ("Certainly, the Alaskan native, who
is dependent upon the ecosystem for subsistence, has suffered damage different in
kind from other Alaskan citizens who have a more tenuous connection to the
environment.").
136. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV (HRH), Order No. 190, 1994 WL
182856, at *2 (D. Alaska Mar. 23, 1994) ("Neither the length of time in which
Alaska Natives have practiced a subsistence lifestyle nor the manner in which it
is practiced makes the Alaska Native subsistence lifestyle unique.").
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subsistence as culture. Native exemptions to endangered species
statutes and the remedial provisions of federal pollution statutes
are two cogent examples.
1. Endangered Species Statutes. Endangered species statutes
that exempt Native subsistence uses from their prohibitions are
intended, to a certain degree, to remedy harm to subsistence as
culture. "Every statute and treaty designed to protect animals or
birds has a specific exemption for Native Alaskans who hunt the
species for subsistence purposes.' ' 7  The Marine Mammal
Protection Act ("MvIPA") 38 and the Endangered Species Act
("ESA") 139 are the most relevant examples. Each act explicitly
exempts from its restrictions Alaska Natives who use the protected
species either for subsistence purposes or for producing Native
handicrafts or clothing."4  The goal of these exceptions is to
protect subsistence as culture,'" both by explicitly limiting the
exemption to Alaska Natives 42 and by permitting Natives to use
protected species for purposes beyond personal consumption.
These provisions come the closest of any body of law to providing
rights that adequately protect subsistence as culture.
However, the rights that these exemptions provide are not
entirely unassailable; in the end, they are actually individual rights.
In the terminology of one commentator, the MMPA and the ESA
only supply "derivative" group rights rather than "intrinsic" rights,
137. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 344 (D.D.C.), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
138. Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407
(1994)).
139. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1549
(1994)).
140. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1371(b) (Alaska Native exemption to the MMPA);
id. § 1539(e) (Alaska Native exemption to the ESA). However, these exemptions
may be withdrawn if the Secretary of the Interior determines that a species
covered by either act is currently depleted. See id. § 1371(b) (MMPA); id.
§ 1539(e)(4) (ESA).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Nuesca, 945 F.2d 254, 257 (9th Cir. 1991) ("The
[ESA's] exemption is based upon food supply and culture."); Katehnikoff v. United
States Dep't of Interior, 657 F. Supp. 659, 666 (D. Alaska 1986) (noting that
Congress's concern in enacting the MMPA exemption was "the preservation of
traditional aspects of native culture and lifestyle").
142. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(b) (MMPA); id. § 1539(e) (ESA). The ESA
exemption applies to both Alaska Natives and non-Native permanent residents of
Native villages. Id. § 1539(e).
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because they are ultimately possessed and asserted by the individu-
al." Therefore, they are as limited as other individual rights
schemes, such as ANILCA. In particular, the Native exemptions
are granted to individual Natives, not to Native groups. Further-
more, they require that takings not be "accomplished in a wasteful
manner."' Thus, the exemptions apparently would not apply in
situations where the taking of a marine mammal or an endangered
species by an individual Native might be wasteful vis-a-vis that
individual, but not wasteful vis-a-vis the Native group. An example
of such an instance would be where the taking is not done for
individual physical consumption, but for cultural occasions, such as
a religious ceremony. Failure to respond to such a situation
demonstrates the limitations of the individual rights scheme these
exemptions employ.
However, the more troubling aspect of these exemptions is that
the remedies available are inadequate to respond to the cultural
harm caused by damage to subsistence resources. While each
contains enforcement mechanisms designed to ensure compliance
with its provisions,45 neither statute remedies harm to culture
resulting from takings of protected wildlife by those not eligible for
the exemption. When Native culture is harmed by those who
violate these statutes, the Natives' only apparent recourse is to seek
to compel future compliance. These laws provide no recompense
for cultural harm already done.
2. Federal Pollution Statutes. Like the endangered species
exceptions, two federal pollution statutes, the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Authorization Act ("TAPAA")' and the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990 ("OPA"),'47 allow recovery for loss of subsistence use
when natural resources are damaged by pollution. TAPAA
provides that holders of pipeline rights-of-way are strictly liable for
143. See Frances Svensson, Liberal Democracy and Group Rights: The Legacy
of Individualism and its Impact on American Indian Tribes, 27 POL. STUD. 421, 421
n.1 (1979).
144. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371(b)(2), 1539(e).
145. The MMPA, for instance, subjects those who violate the act to civil
penalties. See id. § 1375. In addition to statutory penalties, the ESA permits
citizen suits to enforce compliance with its provisions. See id. § 1540(a), (b), (g).
146. Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 576 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 (1988
& Supp. V 1993)).
147. Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
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damages resulting from activities in connection with those rights-of-
way, including the loss of "natural resources relied upon by Alaska
Natives, Native organizations or others for subsistence or economic
purposes," without regard to ownership of those resources.'48
Prior to 1990, TAPAA also authorized strict liability recovery of up
to $100 million from the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund for
"all damages" resulting from the discharge of oil transported
through the trans-Alaska pipeline and loaded on a vessel at the
pipeline's terminal facilities." By regulation, such damages were
defined as "any economic loss,... including but not limited to..
. [lioss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to injury or
destruction of real or personal property or natural resources,
including loss of subsistence hunting, fishing and gathering
opportunities.' 5
0
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System Reform Act of 199015'
repealed this latter provision effective sixty days after all claims
under the TAPAA had been settled. Thus, OPA currently governs
situations previously covered by TAPAA's repealed oil discharge
provision. OPA permits recovery by an Indian tribe trustee for the
loss of natural resources or of the use of such resources 52 and for
damages for loss of subsistence use of natural resources without
regard to ownership.'53
While these statutes allow aggrieved parties to recover for
damage to "subsistence," as currently interpreted, they do not
remedy harm to subsistence as culture. In particular, the statutes
allow anyone relying on natural resources for physical well-be-
ing," and for physical well-being only, to recover for economic
148. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(a)(1).
149. Id. § 1653(c)(1), (3).
150. 43 C.F.R. § 29.1(e) (1988).
151. Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 8102(a)(1), (5)(A), 104 Stat. 565, 566 (amending 43
U.S.C. § 1653).
152. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
153. Id. § 2702(b)(2)(C) (Supp. V 1993).
154. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1653(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993) (permitting recovery under
TAPAA for loss of natural resources "relied upon by Alaska Natives, Native
organizations or others for subsistence or economic purposes") (emphasis added);
33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(C) (permitting recovery under OPA for "loss of subsistence




loss.'55 By equating subsistence with economics, federal pollution
law permits recovery by any individual who relies on subsistence
for sustenance, yet excludes recovery for damage to the subsistence
culture of Native groups. Such a remedial scheme not only seems
inconsistent with the nature of Native subsistence activities;'56 it
subtly equates subsistence with sustenance, thereby failing to cure
cultural harm caused by pollution.
In sum, current attempts at redressing harm to subsistence as
culture, whether they grant rights, remedies or both, are nonethe-
less based on an individual rights perspective of subsistence. As
these legal regimes demonstrate, individual rights are competent
only to protect subsistence as sustenance, even when the intent is
to safeguard subsistence as culture. To truly remedy harm to
subsistence as culture, the nature of legal subsistence rights must be
reconsidered at a fundamental level.
IV. A GROUP RIGHTS APPROACH TO SUBSISTENCE: A
PROPOSAL
Subsistence, as it is used nowadays, it merely lumps us in. The
State of Alaska cannot discriminate, so subsistence is everyone's
right. We use the word subsistence in a politically separate term
and, in fact, when the state uses subsistence, it is a privilege. To
us, subsistence is our inherent riglit because that is how we have
always been and, I believe, that is how we will always be.
-Suzy Erlich, Kotzebue 57
Subsistence is best understood as a unique cultural identity,
worthy of legal protection. Only a right vested in Alaska Natives
as a group will adequately remedy damage to subsistence as
culture. This Part will outline a group rights approach to protecting
subsistence as culture, suggest ways in which harm to subsistence
155. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1653(a)(1) (permitting recovery under TAPAA's
right-of-way provision for damage to natural resources used for "subsistence or
economic purposes") (emphasis added); Sekco Energy, Inc. v. M/V Margaret
Chouest, 820 F. Supp. 1008, 1015 (E.D. La. 1993) (declaring that the term
"subsistence use" under OPA "relates to use of a natural resource.., to obtain
the minimum necessities for life") (emphasis added); In re Cleveland Tankers, Inc.,
791 F. Supp. 669, 678 (E.D. Mich. 1992); 43 C.F.R. § 29.1(e)(6) (declaring that loss
of subsistence opportunities is a function of loss of profits for purposes of the
TAPL Fund).
156. As one observer has explained, "These [whale-hunting] customs must be
viewed as religious rules rather than economic laws." Michie, supra note 16, at 82
n.15 (1979).
157. BERGER, supra note 10, at 65 (quoting Suzy Erlich).
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culture might be adequately remedied under such a scheme, and
show that a notion of group rights is appropriate in this area of the
law. The suggested reforms are generally legislative in nature, for,
as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
observed, "[this] issue . . .cries out for a legislative ... solu-
tion."'58
A. The Proper Group
In order to avoid the pitfalls associated with utilizing individual
rights to protect subsistence as culture, subsistence rights must vest
in, and be asserted by, a group that possesses a core cultural
relationship with subsistence life. There are two possibilities in this
regard. First, Native corporations created under ANCSA could
assert group subsistence rights.' However, the scope of a Native
corporation's authority to protect subsistence would be limited to
the extent of its proprietary interests.'o Moreover, for a Native
corporation to legitimately assert Alaska Natives' right to subsis-
tence, the interests of the corporation would have to be identical
to the interests of its individual shareholders, a proposition that the
federal district court in Alaska has heretofore been unwilling to
accept.' Finally, granting subsistence rights to Native corpora-
tions would require Native corporations to have an obligation,
beyond making a profit, to affirmatively protect subsistence as
culture, another proposition that has not as of yet achieved legal
recognition. 6 2
A more plausible proponent of group rights to subsistence as
culture is Alaska Native villages. First, Native villages are easy to
158. Alaska v. Babbitt, 54 F.3d 549,554 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Alaska
State Legislature v. Alaska, 64 U.S.L.W. 3240 (U.S. Oct. 2, 1995).
159. Vesting a group right to subsistence in Native corporations is intellectually
defensible, as corporations are the only apparent exception to the belief that
liberal democratic theory denies the legitimacy of intrinsic group rights. See
Svensson, supra note 143, at 421 n.1.
160. See, e.g., Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp., 484 F. Supp. 482,488
(D. Alaska 1980) (observing that an Alaska Native corporation's attempt to
protect subsistence as culture "confuses fiduciary obligations with the acquisition
of a compensable interest in such resources and culture"); Quam, supra note 26,
at 188-89 (explaining that, in the Exxon Valdez litigation, Native corporations
could proceed with their legal actions only after they had obtained title to lands
selected under ANCSA).
161. See Aleut Corp., 484 F. Supp. at 487-88.
162. See id. at 488.
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identify. The vast majority of Native villages have been listed as
such, either by ANCSA ' or by the Bureau of Indian Affairs."6
Moreover, membership in such communities, including membership
by Natives currently residing in urban areas, is also determina-
ble." While individual members of Native villages would not be
able to assert rights to subsistence as culture, a Native village's
ability to identify its members still has the important advantage of
allowing the village to determine if harm to the subsistence
activities of individual members constitutes a violation of the
village's group subsistence rights. Therefore, identifying the groups
that would possess cultural subsistence rights would not be an
unworkable task.
Second, Native villages are arguably sovereign Indian tribes,
much like their counterparts in the lower forty-eight states."6 As
such, they would benefit from the "special government-to-govern-
ment relationship between Natives and the federal govern-
ment."'6 7 This is an especially important factor, as under federal
Indian law, tribal status would more easily immunize Native villages
from federal equal protection and due process challenges to their
rights."6 Tribal sovereignty would also allow Congress to bypass
163. See 43 U.S.C. § 1610(b)(1) (1988).
164. See Susanne Di Pietro, Foreword to Native Law Selections: Recent Develop-
ments in Federal Indian Law as Applied to Native Alaskans, 10 ALASKA L. REV.
333, 334 (1993).
165. See Kancewick & Smith, supra note 9, at 674-75.
166. Whether Alaska Native villages have tribal status has been the subject of
some controversy. The debate over this issue is outlined in Smith & Kancewick,
supra note 63, and comprehensive treatment of this volatile issue is beyond the
scope of this Note. However, it should be mentioned that Congress has explicitly
recognized various Alaska Native groups as Indian tribes. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1212-15 (West Supp. 1995) (clarifying that the Central Council of Tlingit and
Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska is a federally recognized Indian tribe and implicitly
noting that there are other federally recognized tribes in Alaska). Moreover, the
United States District Court for the District of Alaska has held that the Neets'aii
Gwich'in of Venetie and Arctic Village satisfy the common law definition of a
tribe enunciated in Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901). Native
Village of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. State, Nos. F86-0075 CIV (HRH), F87-0051
CIV (HRH), 1994 WL 730893 (D. Alaska Dec. 23, 1994). As such, the State of
Alaska must, for instance, afford full faith and credit to the adoption decrees of
the tribal government. Id. at *22.
167. Kancewick & Smith, supra note 9, at 676.
168. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-555 (1974) (observing that
employment preferences for Native Americans do not violate due process "[a]s
long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress's
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contrary provisions in the Alaska Constitution when providing
subsistence rights exclusively to Native villages. 16 9
Third, and perhaps most importantly, Native villages are the
groups most interested in remedying harm to subsistence as culture.
They represent the basic unit in which that culture is practiced,"0
provide the organizational structure of both tribal government'
and village subsistence activities,'" and are the most interested in
the long-term viability of subsistence resources.' As such,
Native villages should be the entities to assert a group right to
subsistence as culture.
B. The Proper Rights
A comprehensive group right to subsistence as culture is not
entirely novel, as the crucial elements of this approach are already
scattered throughout the structure of existing subsistence law.
Nevertheless, expressly adopting a group rights perspective in
subsistence legislation would give life to the concept of subsistence
as culture.
For instance, Kancewick and Smith recommend that Congress
legislatively replace ANILCA's rural residency preference with a
subsistence priority for Native villages. 74 This proposal, they
contend, would protect subsistence as culture, bring treatment of
Alaska Natives into conformity with treatment of other Native
Americans by preempting contrary state law, and resolve the
administrative difficulties of ANILCA's current provisions.' 5
unique obligation toward the Indians").
169. See Kancewick & Smith, supra note 9, at 676.
170. See, e.g., FIENUP-RIORDAN, supra note 15, at 31-35 (describing the
subsistence activities of Native Yup'ik villages); Michie, supra note 16, at 84
(noting that, among the Inupiat, "[d]uring a whale hunt, virtually the entire village
participates in whaling related activities").
171. See Smith & Kancewick, supra note 63, at 491-94.
172. See Michie, supra note 16, at 79 n.1 (observing that, among the Inupiat, the
whaling crew captain serves as de facto chief of the Native village because of his
leadership role in subsistence activities).
173. See Quam, supra note 26, at 187-91 (contrasting the Native corporations'
goal of being compensated for damage to their property interests resulting from
the Exxon Valdez spill with the Native villages' objective of having subsistence
resources returned to their pre-spill condition).
174. See Kancewick & Smith, supra note 9, at 674-77. ANILCA's remaining
provisions, including its two-tier subsistence priority, would be retained and would
operate in the same manner as at present. See id. at 675.
175. Id. at 675-77.
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Moreover, such legislation would achieve these goals, they con-
clude, without impairing the state's ability to enact secondary
subsistence priorities for non-Native uses.
176
While Kancewick and Smith's proposal effectively responds to
ANILCA's defects, additional measures are necessary to apply a
group rights perspective to subsistence doctrines currently based on
individual rights. For instance, eligibility for an exemption to
endangered species statutes should remain limited to Alaska
Natives,'" but the ability to claim the exemption should also vest
in Native villages. These statutes would thereby protect group
subsistence activities that would not otherwise qualify as individual
subsistence under the statutes' current provisions. In proceedings
against individual Natives for alleged violations of these laws,
individual Natives would still be able to offer subsistence use as a
defense, as permitted by the current exemptions. In addition,
however, Native villages would also be able to argue for exemption
from the statutes on the grounds that the activities of their
members were undertaken for the cultural use of the group. The
overall effect would be to recognize the cultural uses of these
resources by Native villages, overcoming the weaknesses inherent
in an individual rights approach to subsistence. 78
These proposals would also help to correct the anomalies in
federal maritime law evident in the Exxon Valdez decision. The
primary aim of the group rights approach is to establish definitively
that the cultural harm suffered by Alaska Natives when subsistence
resources are lost is different in kind from the harm suffered by the
general public. 9 Thus, if a qualitative difference between
subsistence as sustenance and subsistence as culture were statutorily
enacted, Native groups would have little difficulty in bringing
private actions for public nuisances under federal maritime law to
obtain relief from environmental disasters such as the Exxon
Valdez oil spill. To be true to the proposed group rights approach,
176. For example, Kancewick and Smith suggest that state law could grant non-
Native uses of subsistence resources for sustenance a priority over commercial and
sport uses. Id. at 675.
177. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(b) (1994) (MMPA's Alaska Native exemption); 16
U.S.C. § 1539(e) (1994) (ESA's Alaska Native exemption); see also supra notes
137-42 and accompanying text.
178. For a discussion of these weaknesses in the context of exemptions to
endangered species statutes, see supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
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only Native villages would be able to assert a public nuisance claim
successfully; individual Natives, or a class thereof, would not. Thus,
because the plaintiffs in Exxon Valdez were a class of individual
Natives asserting individual rights,'8 the court's decision is
actually consistent both with current federal maritime law and with
the proposed group rights approach. The court implicitly seemed
to recognize as much in noting that "[t]he affront to Native culture
occasioned by [the oil spill] is not actionable on an individual
basis."' However, the recommendations offered here would
make such damage actionable on a group basis, a fundamentally
distinct method of ensuring the protection of cultural subsistence
rights.
C. The Proper Remedies
In addition to modifications in subsistence rights, the remedies
giving effect to those rights should also be modified to redress
harm to subsistence as culture more effectively. In keeping with
the nature of the rights involved, the proposed remedies should
reflect a group approach to subsistence as well. Beyond those
already in existence," 2 this Note offers three proposals for ex-
panding the remedies for harm to subsistence as culture. First,
both ANILCA and the endangered species statutes should be
amended to permit private suits by Native villages against those
who violate the statutes' provisions. Native villages could seek
either to enjoin future violations of these statutes' or to collect
damages for cultural harm caused by past violations."8  This
180. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1994 WL 182856, at * 1 (D. Alaska
March 23, 1994) (noting that the plaintiffs were an "Alaska Native class").
181. Id. at *5 (emphasis added).
182. For reference to existing remedies under ANILCA, see supra notes 94-97
and accompanying text. For a discussion of existing remedies under MMPA and
ESA, see supra note 145 and accompanying text. The entire discussion about the
inability of federal oil pollution statutes to protect subsistence as culture, supra
notes 146-56 and accompanying text, is also essentially about remedies.
183. ANILCA already permits suits seeking injunctive relief, including
preliminary injunctions, see 16 U.S.C. § 3117 (1994), and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that harm to culture is independently
sufficient to constitute an irreparable injury that cannot be adequately remedied
at law. See Native Village of Quinhagak v. United States, 35 F.3d 388 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding that allegations of harm to subsistence warrants the granting of a
preliminary injunction); see also supra note 83 and accompanying text.
184. For instance, OPA already permits recovery for some damage to
subsistence. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(C) (Supp. V 1993); supra notes 152-53 and
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remedy would function much like suits by Indian tribe trustees
already permitted by current law.'8 Moreover, this remedy is not
entirely without precedent, as the ESA already permits suits by
private citizens to enforce its provisions.'86 To be sure, proving
liability in such suits may be difficult. Under the group rights
approach, Native villages would be required to establish that
unlawful conduct proximately caused cultural harm to the village
as a whole, and not just to its individual members. Nevertheless,
a private remedy would redress cultural harm left unremedied by
present law, thereby vindicating subsistence as culture.
Second, current pollution statutes should explicitly permit
Native villages to recover cultural damages occasioned by the loss
of resources relied upon for subsistence. Natives should also be
able to obtain injunctive relief similar to that proposed for
ANILCA and the endangered species statutes under the federal oil
pollution provisions. These remedies would acknowledge the
significant cultural harm that pollution can cause and provide relief
accordingly, either through compensation or through injunction of
the source of the pollution. Such remedies are not without
precedent. For example, TAPAA's right-of way provision currently
permits Alaska Native organizations to recover for loss of natural
resources used for subsistence without regard to ownership of those
accompanying text.
185. See, eg., 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1993) (permitting Indian tribe
trustees to recover damages under OPA for loss of, or loss of use of, natural
resources).
Recognizing a trust relationship between Alaska Native villages and its
members is one way in which the interests of individual Alaska Natives can be
protected under the proposed approach to subsistence. Individual members could
also use the village's political processes to persuade the village to pursue the
course of action desired by the members. A village will necessarily respond to
views on which there is a general consensus among its members. As one
commentator has explained:
[The] survival [of American cities and Indian tribes] depends almost
completely on the ability to muster support on critical issues from their
residents and convince outsiders of the merits of their causes. The fact
that tribes and cities have remained vibrant and autonomous in many
respects is a testimony to their ability to build internal consensus and
acquire external acceptance.
Kevin J Worthen, Two Sides of the Same Coin: The Potential Normative Power of
American Cities and Indian Tribes, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1273, 1287 (1991) (footnotes
omitted).
186. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994).
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resources.'8' A group rights subsistence approach would simply
import this concept into OPA's damages provisions. It would also
explicitly modify both TAPAA and OPA to bestow remedies on
Native villages to compensate them for cultural damages due to the
loss of natural resources. Notwithstanding the group rights
approach's focus on subsistence as culture, it would not eliminate
a Native or non-Native individual's ability under present law to
recover for loss of natural resources relied upon for individual
sustenance. Alaska Native villages could merely seek additional
compensation, over and above that already available to individuals,
for the cultural harm suffered as a result of pollution.
Third, in suits for damages, recovery should be measured by
the degree of group harm suffered. Such a measure would be
roughly similar to a group form of hedonic damages already
permitted under personal injury law. Because harm to culture is
essentially a damage to the group's ability to enjoy its collective
"life," such a measure would most closely approximate the type of
harm suffered by Native villages. Indeed, the court in Exxon
Valdez recognized that the Native class's claim for cultural damages
was akin to a loss of enjoyment of life claim, but it rejected the
theory because the Natives did not assert a personal injury
claim."8  A group rights approach would compensate Native
villages for cultural harm without any requirement that they
establish individual injury, as the cultural harm is suffered by the
group as a whole, rather than by any one individual.
While admittedly unusual, it is not unimaginable to conceptual-
ize compensable harm to a community. In United States v.
Hatahley,89 a federal district court adopted just such an approach.
In assessing the pain and suffering experienced by Native Ameri-
cans due to the unlawful seizure and destruction of their horses and
burros, the district court employed a concept of "community loss"
or "community sorrow" to reach a total figure representative of the
amount of loss suffered by the community. The court then equally
divided that total among the individual plaintiffs, awarding $3500
to each.Y Although the Tenth Circuit rejected this formulation
187. See 43 U.S.C. § 1653(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
188. See In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1994 WL 182856, at *5 (D.
Alaska March 23, 1994).
189. 257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 899 (1958).
190. Id. at 924-25.
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of damages,'9' it did so, in part, because it stated that the right
involved was an individual one."9 A concept of damages based
on the compensation of group rights would permit such an
approach to assessing cultural damages without violating fundamen-
tal principles of remedies law.'" Alaska Natives possess a group
right to lead their subsistence way of life; therefore, courts of law
should not be powerless to remedy a loss that can be felt only in
the aggregate, despite the law's ordinary insistence on individual
vindication.
D. The Proper Approach
The tendency of Anglo-American law and liberal democratic
theory is to grant rights only to individuals. 94 As a general rule,
conferring legal rights on groups, particularly ethnic groups, is not
viewed as a legally legitimate function of the law. 95 In short,
group rights remain a controversial concept. Nevertheless, there
are several reasons why employing a group approach to Native
rights in general, and subsistence rights in particular, provides
perhaps the strongest rationale for an exception to this rule.
First, Native Americans, including Alaska Natives, occupied
America before the Europeans, and their own legal and political
institutions were already in place when the Europeans arrived.'96
Thus, in contrast to other ethnic groups, they have no homeland
other than this country in which to ensure their culture's preserva-
tion.' 97 Moreover, no other ethnic group can assert a right to
culture based on an ancient connection to this land.' Cultural
191. Id. at 925.
192. Id.
193. See id. at 923 ("The fundamental principle of damages is to restore the
injured party, as nearly as possible, to the position he would have been in had it
not been for the wrong of the other party.").
194. For a general discussion of this principle in the context of Native American
tribes, see Svensson, supra note 143.
195. See, e.g., id. at 429 (observing that in liberal democratic theory, "[o]nly
individuals are conceived of as holding rights and bearing claims; groups are
merely aggregates of individuals whose status in law and politics arises not from
their collective identity, but from the rights and interests of the individuals of
which they are composed").
196. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 10, at 155-56 ("[Native Americans] were here
first, with their own societies, laws, and institutions...
197. See, e.g., Worthen, supra note 57, at 628-29.
198. See BERGER, supra note 10, at 156-57 ("[A] land-based culture and way of
life mark Native Americans off from other minorities.").
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preservation in this country is therefore a compelling goal for
Alaska Natives, and all Native Americans, in ways that it is not for
other cultural groups. Thus, the imperatives of preserving Native
culture justify the adoption of a group rights approach to subsis-
tence.
Second, unlike many other ethnic minorities in the United
States, Native Americans, including Alaska Natives, did not
voluntarily accept the individualist principles of liberalism byimmigrating to this country.'99 For instance, Native tribes did not
relinquish any of their sovereignty when the United States was
formed. Therefore, as groups, Native American tribes should,
in theory at least, possess greater rights than American states, who
did surrender some degree of sovereignty when this country was
founded."' Treating Alaska Native villages as sovereign tribes
for purposes of federal Indian law' would strengthen the claim
that group rights are an appropriate means by which to protect
subsistence as culture.
Third, due to a long history of wrongs wrought against them,
Native Americans are "specially disadvantaged groups" whom,
under one theory, the equal protection clause was designed to
protect.' Under this view, use of a group rights approach to
199. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 10, at 155-56 ("Native Americans... did not
choose America ... and they wish to remain distinct."); Kapashesit & Klip-
penstein, supra note 55, at 942 ("Aboriginal communities ... have not in any
comparable way consented to be part of a liberal individualist social structure.").
200. See Clinton, supra note 22, at 745 n.16 ("The people of the states
consented to the diminution in their sovereignty which occurred through the
adoption of the United States Constitution. ... By contrast, the tribes were
involuntarily forced into the federal union, often in violation of express or implied
treaty guarantees of political autonomy.") (citations omitted).
201. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 21 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (observing that under the majority's
holding in the case, federal courts must, under certain circumstances, give more
deference to tribal court decisions than to state court decisions); BERGER, supra
note 10, at 157 ("No other minority can assert a right to ... distinct political
institutions founded on the recognition of Native sovereignty."); Clinton, supra
note 22, at 745 ("[T]he tribal claim to group political, cultural, religious, and other
forms of group autonomy and rights is far stronger than the states' claim to state
rights as a group.").
202. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
203. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 107,154-55 (1976). The criteria to qualify as a "specially disadvantaged
group" under Fiss' analysis is three-fold: (1) social groupness; (2) perpetual
subordination; and (3) circumscribed political power. Id. Native Americans,
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address subsistence as culture would not violate equal protection
principles, irrespective of the tribal status of Alaska Natives.
Finally, Alaska is the "last frontier" regarding Native hunting and
fishing rights. In comparison with their counterparts in contiguous
America, Alaska Natives have only recently been exposed to the
advances of western civilization; they have not yet been overrun by
them. Alaska therefore offers perhaps the final location in the
United States in which subsistence remains able to act as a viable
cultural system. As group rights are the most effective means to
preserve this viability, their use in protecting Native culture is
justified.
V. CONCLUSION
The harm to the subsistence culture of Alaska Natives
resulting from its increasing contact with Western expansion merits
legal consideration. Current law, however, provides an inadequate
response to this harm, due to its unwavering allegiance to individu-
al rights. The proposals offered here demonstrate that subsistence
culture is most effectively protected by some type of group right.
Moreover, Alaska Native subsistence presents one of the strongest
cases for departing from American law's general commitment to
individualism. The revisions proposed in this n6te are wide-ranging
in scope, and will certainly not occur overnight. While 1989 may
indeed have been a benchmark year in defining the current
subsistence controversy, more difficult years and decisions un-
doubtably lie ahead.
William M. Bryner
including Native Alaskans, meet all three criteria.
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